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Abstract
We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for coopera-
tive production of virtual products. In our model, a group of
producers collaboratively produce a virtual product by con-
tributing costly input resources to a production coalition. Pro-
ducers are capacitated, i.e., they cannot contribute more re-
sources than their capacity limits. Our model is an abstraction
of emerging internet-based business models such as feder-
ated learning and crowd computing. To maintain an efficient
and stable production coalition, the coordinator should share
with producers the income brought by the virtual product. Be-
sides the demand-side information asymmetry, another two
sources of supply-side information asymmetry intertwined in
this problem: 1) the capacity limit of each producer and 2) the
cost incurred to each producer. In this paper, we rigorously
prove that a supply-side mechanism from the VCG family,
PVCG, can overcome such multiple information asymmetry
and guarantee truthfulness. Furthermore, with some reason-
able assumptions, PVCG simultaneously attains truthfulness,
ex-post allocative efficiency, ex-post individual rationality,
and ex-post weak budget balancedness on the supply side,
easing the well-known tension between these four objectives
in the mechanism design literature.
Introduction
On this flat earth created by the internet, hierarchies of
companies are falling away. Production activities are no
longer a process confined within the border of an enterprise.
Independent businesses can cooperate seamlessly through
distributed computing systems to produce valuable virtual
products. For example, a fast-developing technology, fed-
erated learning (FL), enables businesses to train (produce)
artificial intelligence models collaboratively (Yang et al.
∗This work was supported by LogiOcean Technologies, Ltd.
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2019a). Another example is crowd computing, where par-
ticipants contribute their redundant computing capacity to
distributed computing tasks (e.g., protein folding simulation
in the Folding@home project (Beberg et al. 2009)). These
production models differ from classical ones in at least two
respects: First, collaborative production creates synergies,
i.e., participants working together generate more value than
they working separately; Second, the output is virtual prod-
ucts, which is non-tangible and non-rivalrous, i.e., the con-
sumption of the virtual products by one participant does not
reduce the amount available for others. While the first fea-
ture encourages cooperation, the second feature results in
the free rider problem, i.e., participants lack the incentives
to ally to attain the socially optimal result. Currently, coop-
erative production applications are mostly run as small-scale
not-for-profit projects, heavily relying on volunteers’ par-
ticipation, thus hindering their popularization. A profitable
business model is necessary for cooperative production to
develop faster in the economic world.
The design of such a business model is challenging due to
two reasons: First, there are multiple dimensions of asym-
metric information, i.e., the demand side is privately in-
formed about its valuation of cooperative production while
the supply side is privately informed about its cost and ca-
pacity constraint of supplying input resources; Second, in
many realistic applications, an agent can both demand and
supply cooperative production, e.g., businesses may both de-
mand and supply data under federated learning. In this pa-
per, we show that if the demand side’s valuation satisfies
a correlation condition, then we can use the combination
of Cre´mer-McLean mechanism (Cre´mer and McLean 1985;
Kosenok and Severinov 2008) and VCG mechanism to sepa-
rately solve the asymmetric information problem for the de-
mand side and supply side: on the demand side, the Cre´mer-
McLean mechanism enables us to extract full consumer sur-
plus for their usage of the virtual products and maximize the
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revenue distributable to the supply side; on the supply side,
the VCG mechanism enables us to overcome the free-rider
problem by compensating producers for their contribution of
input resources and achieve socially efficient allocation.
In this paper, our contributions include: 1) We set up a
game-theoretical model for cooperative production of virtual
products, which takes into consideration twofold supply-
side information asymmetry in addition to the demand-side
information asymmetry; 2) We propose a procurement auc-
tion that incentivizes participants to report their private in-
formation honestly (truthfulness) and maximizes social wel-
fare ex post (allocative efficiency); 3) We apply neural net-
work methods to optimizing for ex-post individual ratio-
nality and ex-post weak budget balancedness; 4) We prove
with some reasonable assumptions, truthfulness, ex-post al-
locative efficiency, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post
weak budget balancedness can be attained simultaneously.
Related Works
Our game-theoretic model is an abstraction of emerging
internet-based cooperative production practices. Although
underlying technologies of cooperative production are fast
developing, existing studies on these new business mod-
els are quite limited. From a more general perspective,
our model is a special type of cooperative games (Pe-
leg and Sudho¨lter 2007; Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs 2008;
Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge 2011), which have
attracted great attention from the algorithmic game theory
community (Sandholm and Lesser 1997; Conitzer and Sand-
holm 2006; Chalkiadakis et al. 2010; Elkind et al. 2009;
Bachrach et al. 2009). Designing an optimal sharing rule
is a key concern when studying cooperative games (Kron-
bak and Lindroos 2007; Niyato, Vasilakos, and Kun 2011;
Weikard 2009).
We decouples the cooperative production game into a
demand-side game and a supply-side game. On the de-
mand side, we use the Cre´mer-McLean mechanism (Cre´mer
and McLean 1985; Kosenok and Severinov 2008; Albert,
Conitzer, and Lopomo 2015) to extract consumer surplus.
On the supply side, we proposed the PVCG mechanism,
which borrows the idea of procurement auction from pro-
curement games (Chen et al. 2005; Chandrashekar et al.
2007; Iyengar and Kumar 2008; Drechsel and Kimms 2010).
Compared to existing research, our model takes into ac-
count three sources of information asymmetry, one on the
demand side and two on the supply side, yet we simultane-
ously achieve truthfulness, allocative efficiency, individual
rationality, and ex-post weak budget balancedness, easing
the well-known tension between these objectives (Jackson
2014). We also follow the recent trend of neural-network-
based mechanism design (Shen, Tang, and Zuo 2019).
Federated learning (Yang et al. 2019a; Yang et al. 2019b)
and crowd computing (Beberg et al. 2009; Larson et al.
2009) are examples of the cooperative production game un-
der study. Therefore, our work is also related to the literature
on training machine learning models with strategic partici-
pants (Jia et al. 2019; Wang 2019; Cai, Daskalakis, and Pa-
padimitriou 2015; Richardson, Filos-Ratsikas, and Faltings
2019; Westenbroek et al. 2019; Yu et al. 2020) and crowd
computing from the angle of game theory (Christoforou et
al. 2013).
Game Settings
We study a cooperative production game where a set of n
producers, denoted byN = {0, 1, . . . , n−1}, cooperatively
produce a valuable virtual product, of which copies are diliv-
ered to m consumers, denoted by M = {n, n + 1, . . . , n +
m − 1}. A participant may be both a producer and a con-
sumer, but we assume that its behaviors as a producer and as
a consumer are independent. On the supply side, producers
contribute input resources to the production coalition, e.g.,
labor, raw materials, equipments, etc. On the demand side,
consumers are granted access to utilize the output virtual
product. We introduce a parameter xi ≥ 0 to measure the in-
put resources contributed by producer i. xi may be a vector
when multiple input resources are involved. We use another
parameter y to measure the usefulness of the output product,
which is determined by the contributed input resources from
all producers, i.e., y is a function of x = (x0, . . . , xn−1).
The usefulness of the output product determines the value
it brings to consumers. We use the parameter vj , j ∈ N to
denote the valuation of participant j ∈ M on the output
product. vj is a function of y and a type parameter θj ∈ Θj
(called valuation type) that reflects the heterogeneity among
consumers. The type space is Θj = {θ1j , · · · , θmjj } of car-
dinality mj < ∞ and we assume that 0 ∈ Θj for all j. We
denote this function by w(·) and call the composite function
of w(·) and y(·) the individual valuation function, denoted
by v(·), i.e., v(x, θi) = w(y(x), θi) = vi. For convenience,
θj is such chosen that v(x, θj) ≡ 0 when θj = 0. We de-
note θ = (θn, θn+1, ..., θn+m−1). Contributing resources to
the cooperative production process incurs costs to partici-
pants. Producer i’s cost ci = c(xi, γi) is a function (called
individual cost function) of xi and another type parameter
γi that reflects the heterogeneity of producer i. We denote
γ = (γ0, ..., γn−1). In our game, producers are assumed to
be capacitated, i.e., producer i cannot contribute more re-
sources than its capacity limit x¯i, i.e., xi ≤ x¯i. Both the
type parameters γi, θj and the capacity limit x¯i are private
information unknown to the coalition coordinator a priori.
This coordinator makes the transfer payment pi to producer
i and pj to consumer j. Participants’ preference is repre-
sented by quasi-linear utilities ui = pi − ci, i ∈ N and
uj = pj + vj , j ∈ M . We use social surplus S(x,γ) =∑n+m−1
j=n v(x, θj) −
∑n−1
i=0 c(xi, γi) to measure the social
effect of the production coalition. Social surplus maximiza-
tion implies Pareto efficiency (or allocative efficiency in the
language of mechanism design).
Parameters in our model have concrete meanings in sce-
narios such as federated learning (FL) and crowd comput-
ing. In FL, the input resources are data. xi measures the size
and quality of the contributed dataset. (Measuring the qual-
ity of datasets is a separate problem. We do not go deeper
here.) The capacity limit x¯i is the best dataset owned by
participant i. ci is the cost of collecting and cleaning data.
vi is the value of the federated model to each participant
(e.g., for the use case that banks use FL to train AI models
to predict credit risk, vi is calculated as the reduced bad debt
rate times the principle of loans). In crowd computing, xi
is the contributed computing power, ci costs of computing
power (e.g., electricity costs, hardware costs, etc), and vj is
the value of the computation result (e.g., the value of protein
folding result to drug development).
We put forward five assumptions on the individual val-
uation function v(x, θj) and the individual cost function
c(xi, γi). Assumption 1-2 are used for proving truthfulness
and alloactive efficiency. Assumption 3-5 are used for prov-
ing individual rationality and ex-post weak budget balanced-
ness.
Assumption 1 (Smoothness and monotocity). The individ-
ual valuation function v(x, θj) is a smooth and monotonic
increasing function of x and θj . The individual cost function
c(xi, γi) is a smooth and monotonic increasing function of
xi and γi.
Assumption 2 (Zero input resource makes no difference).
If xi = 0, then: (1) participant i makes no differ-
ence to the value of the output product, i.e., v(x, θj) =
v((0,x−i), θj) = v(x−i, θj),∀j, θj; (2) participant i bears
no cost, i.e., c(xi, γi) = c(0, γi) = 0, ∀γi.
Assumption 3 (Super additivity). The individual valuation
function v(x, θj) is super additive with respect to xi, i =
0, . . . , n− 1, i.e.,
v(x, θj) ≥
n−1∑
i=0
v(xi, θj),∀x, θj . (1)
Assumption 4 (Decreasing cross marginal returns). The
marginal return of one producer’s input resources decreases
when other producers contribute more input resources, i.e.,
for all i ∈ N, j ∈ M, θj and xi ≥ x′i, x−i ≥ x′−i, the
following inequality holds:
v((xi,x−i), θj)− v((x′i,x−i), θj)
≤v((xi,x′−i), θj)− v((x′i,x′−i), θj). (2)
Assumption 5 (Correlated and identifiable valuation types).
The prior belief on valuation types, Prior(θ), is iden-
tifiable and correlated, i.e., the identifiability condition
(Kosenok and Severinov 2008) and Cre´mer-McLean condi-
tion (Cre´mer and McLean 1985) hold for all consumers.
The economic meaning of super additivity is that cooper-
ative production brings synergies, i.e., the value created by
the production coalition is higher than the total value created
by independent producers. The rationality of Assumption 4
comes from the law of diminishing marginal returns: when
many resources have already been involved in a production
process, the marginal return brought by an additional unit
of input resources decreases. As an example, the following
individual valuation function satisfies all these four assump-
tions:
v(x, θj) = θj
√√√√n n−1∑
k=0
z(xk)2, (3)
where z(xi) is an arbitrary smooth and increasing func-
tion (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas function). Assumption 5 is
introduced to guarantee full consumer surplus, so that
we can derive the income of the coalition −∑n+m−1j=n pj
from individual valuation functions, i.e., −∑n+m−1j=n pj =∑n+m−1
j=n v(x, θj), because we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Cre´mer-McLean Theorem). There exists an
interim individually rational and ex-post budget balanced
Bayesian mechanism that extracts full consumer surplus if
Prior(θ) is identifiable and Cre´mer-McLean condition holds
for all consumers.
Proofs of Theorem 1 can be found in (Cre´mer and
McLean 1985) and (Kosenok and Severinov 2008). We
can construct such a demand-side Cre´mer-McLean mecha-
nism by following the constructive proof of Lemma A3 in
(Kosenok and Severinov 2008) or by automated mechanism
design techniques (Albert, Conitzer, and Lopomo 2015). We
will not go into further detail here because we focus on
the supply-side game. For theoretical analyses in this pa-
per, we take as a given that the production coalition uses
Cre´mer-McLean mechanism to extract full consumer sur-
plus. This also guarantees the reported valuation type θˆj
equals the true valuation type θj for all consumer j ∈ M .
Theorem 1 transfers the ex-post weak budget balance con-
straint
∑n+m−1
l=0 pl ≤ 0 to the following inequality:
n−1∑
i=0
pi ≤
n+m−1∑
j=n
v(x, θj). (4)
This decouples the supply-side mechanism design problem
from the demand-side problem.
The Procurement Auction
As a counterpart of Cre´mer-McLean mechanism which
is optimal on the demand side, we introduce an optimal
supply-side procurement auction in this section. This pro-
posed procurement auction, accompnied by the demand-side
Cre´mer-McLean mechanism, maximizes social surplus by
incentivizing producers to truthfully report their capacity
limits and type parameters. This procurement auction con-
sists of four steps, of which the soundness will be proved in
the next section.
Step 1. Producers bid on capacity limits and cost
types
As the first step, every producer submits a sealed bid for
their respective capacity limits and cost types. The reported
capacity limit xˆi is the maximum resources that producer i
is willing to offer to the coalition. It may differ from the true
capacity limit x¯i. Similarly, the reported cost type γˆi may
differ from the true cost type γi.
Step 2. The coordinator chooses the optimal
acceptance ratios
Then, the coalition coordinator decides how many input
resources to accept from each producer. It chooses xi ≤
xˆi, i = 0, . . . , n − 1 that maximize the social surplus, con-
strained by reported capacity limits and based on reported
type parameters. Equivalently, the coordinator calculates the
optimal acceptance ratio ηi ∈ [0, 1]dim(xi) = xi  xˆi such
that xi = xˆi  ηi, where  and  denote the element-wise
multiplication and division respectively, and [0, 1] denotes
the interval between 0 and 1. The economic meaning of ηi is
the ratio of input resources accepted by the coalition to those
offered by the producer.
The optimal acceptance ratios (η∗0 , . . . , η
∗
n−1) = η
∗ are
calculated according to the following formula:
η∗ = argmaxη∈[0,1]dim(xi)×n{S(xˆ η, γˆ, θˆ)} (5)
= argmax
η∈[0,1]dim(xi)×n
n+m−1∑
j=n
v(xˆ η, θj)−
n−1∑
i=0
ci(xˆi  ηi, γˆi).
Because different (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) results in different η∗, η∗ is
written as η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ). Correspondingly, the maximum so-
cial surplus is denoted by S∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) =
∑n+m−1
j=n v(xˆ 
η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), θˆj)−
∑n−1
i=0 ci(xˆiη∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆi). It is worth
noting that although S∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) and S(x,γ,θ) both repre-
sent social surplus, they are different functions. The first pa-
rameter x in S(·) is the accepted input resources, whereas
the first parameter xˆ in S∗(·) is the reported capacity limits.
x and xˆ are related by x = xˆ η∗.
Step 3. Producers contribute accepted input
resources to the production coalition
In this step, producers are required to contribute xˆη∗ units
of input resources to the production coalition. Since in the
first step, producer i has promised to offer at most xˆi units
of input resources, if it cannot contribute xˆi  η∗i ≤ xˆi, we
impose a high punishment on it. With the contributed in-
put resources, producers collaboratively produce the output
virtual product, bringing value v(xˆ  η∗, θj) to consumer
j ∈M .
Step 4. The coordinator makes transfer payments
to participants according to the PVCG sharing rule
In this final step, the coordinator pays producers according
to the PVCG sharing rule. The PVCG payment
pi(·) = τi(·) + h∗i (·) (6)
is composed of two parts, the VCG payment τi and the opti-
mal adjustment payment h∗i . The VCG payment is designed
to induce truthfulness, i.e., the reported capacity limits xˆ and
reported cost type γˆ are equal to the true capacity limits x¯
and true cost type γ. The adjustment payment is optimized
so that ex-post individual rationality and ex-post weak bud-
get balancedness can also be attained.
With η∗ calculated in Step 2, the VCG payment τi to pro-
ducer i is:
τi = S
∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ−i)− S∗−i(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ)
+ c(xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆi)
=
n+m−1∑
j=n
[v(xˆ η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), θˆj)− v(xˆ−i  η−i∗(
xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ), θˆj)]−
n−1∑
k=0, 6=i
[c(xˆk  η∗k(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆk)
− c(xˆk  η−i∗k (xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ), γˆk)], (7)
where (xˆ−i, γˆ−i) denotes the reported capacity limits and
the reported cost types excluding producer i. η−i∗ and
S∗−i(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ) are the corresponding optimal acceptance
ratios and maximum social surplus. Note that η−i∗ is differ-
ent from η∗−i: the former maximizes S(xˆ−i  η−i, γˆ−i, θˆ),
whereas the latter is the component of η∗ that maximizes
S(xˆ  η, γˆ, θˆ). τ = (τ0, . . . , τn−1) is a function of
(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), written as τ (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ).
The adjustment payment hi(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ) is a func-
tion of (xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ). The optimal adjustment payments
(h∗0(·), . . . , h∗n−1(·)) = h∗(·) are determined by solving the
following functional equation (a type of equation in which
the unknowns are functions instead of variables; refer to
(Rassias 2012) for more details):
n−1∑
i=0
ReLu[−(S∗(x,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x−i,γ−i,θ))
− hi(x−i,γ−i,θ)] + ReLu{
n−1∑
i=0
[(S∗(x,γ,θ)
− S∗−i(x−i,γ−i,θ)) + hi(x−i,γ−i,θ)] (8)
− S∗(x,γ,θ)} ≡ 0, ∀(x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x,γ,θ)),
where supp(Prior(x,γ,θ)) is the support of the prior dis-
tribution Prior(x,γ,θ) of the true parameters (x,γ,θ) esti-
mated by the coalition coordinator. Support is a terminology
from measure theory, defined by supp(Prior(x,γ,θ)) =
{(x,γ,θ)|Prior(x,γ,θ) > 0}. In general, there is no
closed-form solution to Eq. 8, so we employ neural network
techniques to learn the solution. We will go into more details
later.
Theoretical Analyses
Theoretical analyses in this section are organized through
the following strand:
1. First (in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2), we prove that
for arbitrary hi(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ), i = 0, . . . , n−1, the PVCG
payments guarantee supply-side truthfulness (dominant
strategy incentive compatibility) and maximize social sur-
plus (allocative efficiency).
2. Second (in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4), given that
Cre´mer-McLean Theorem (Theorem 1) holds on the de-
mand side, we derive two ineqaulity cosntraints on the
adjustment payment hi(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ), which are sufficient
and necessary conditions for ex-post individual rational-
ity and ex-post weak budget balancedness. We show that
these constraints can be transformed into Eq. 8, which is
equivalent to a minimization problem that can be solved
by neural network methods.
3. Lastly (in Theorem 2 and Corollary 4), we prove the ex-
istence of at least one solution h∗(·) to Eq. 8. The PVCG
payment corresponding to this solution attains truthful-
ness, ex-post allocative efficiency, ex-post individual ra-
tionality, and ex-post weak budget balancedness simulta-
neously on the supply side.
First, we prove that for arbitrary hi(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ), the pay-
ment pi(·) = τi(·)+hi(·) encourages all producers to report
their capacity limits and cost types truthfully.
Proposition 1 (Dominant strategy incentive compatibility).
For every producer i, truthfully reporting its capacity limit
x¯i and cost type γi is its dominant strategy, i.e.,
pi((x¯i, xˆ−i), (γi, γˆ−i), θˆ)
− c(x¯i  η∗i ((x¯i, xˆ−i), (γi, γˆ−i), (θi, θˆ−i)), γi)
≥ pi(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ)− ci(xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γi)
,∀i ∈ N, xi, xˆ, γi, γˆ, θˆ. (9)
Proof. We differentiate the cases where xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) >
x¯i with those where xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) ≤ x¯i.
(1) When xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) > x¯i,
it is impossible for producer i to contribute the accepted
amount of input resources xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) because this ex-
ceeds its capacity limit. In this case, producer i suffers a
high punishment, i.e., pi(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) is a large negative num-
ber. Hence, the right side of Eq. 9 becomes extremely nega-
tive and Eq. 9 holds. This shows a rational producer will not
choose xˆi such that xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) > x¯i.
(2) When xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) ≤ x¯i,
we aim to prove that by truthfully reporting x¯i, γi, and θi,
the utility of producer i is at least the same as before.
By definition,
S∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) = maxη∈[0,1]dim(xi)×n{
∑n+m−1
j=n v(xˆη, θˆj)−∑n−1
i=0 c(xˆiηi, γˆi)},∀xˆ, γˆ, θˆ. We substitute (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) with
((x¯i, xˆ−i), (γi, γˆ−i), θˆ) and get
S∗((x¯i, xˆ−i), (γi, γˆ−i), θˆ)
≥
n+m−1∑
j=n
v((x¯i, xˆ−i) η, θj)− c(x¯i  ηi, γi)
−
n∑
k=0,6=i
c(xˆk  ηk, γˆk), ∀η ∈ [0, 1]dim(xi)×n. (10)
In particular, for η = (xˆiη∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ)x¯i,η∗−i(xˆ, γˆ,θ)) ∈
[0, 1]dim(xi)×n, Eq. 10 holds. Therefore,
S∗((x¯i, xˆ−i), (γi, γˆ−i), θˆ)
≥
n+m−1∑
j=n
[v((x¯i, xˆ−i) (xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) x¯i
,η∗−i(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ)), θˆj)−
n−1∑
k=0,6=i
c(xˆk  η∗k(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆk)
− c(x¯i  xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) x¯i, γi)
=S∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) (11)
+ c(xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆi)− c(xˆi  η∗i (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γi).
Adding hi(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ−i) − S∗−i(xˆ−i, γˆ−i, θˆ−i) to both
sides of Eq. 11 and substituting pi(·) + v(·) − c(·) =
S∗(·)− S∗−i(·) + h(·), we get Eq. 9.
From Proposition 1, we know reported parameters equal
true parameters, i.e., (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) = (x¯,γ,θ). Therefore, we
can use these two sets of parameters interchangeably in the
remaining parts of this paper.
Proposition 2 (Ex-post social surplus maximization / alloca-
tive efficiency). PVCG maximizes social surplus ex post.
Proof. Suppose x∗∗ = argmaxx≤x¯{S(x,γ,θ)} and S∗∗ =
S(x∗∗,γ,θ). We aim to prove that PVCG results in ex-post
social surplus no less than S∗∗.
By definition of η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ),
S(xˆ η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ), γˆ, θˆ) ≥ S(xˆ η, γˆ, θˆ), ∀η. (12)
Incentive compatibility guarantees xˆ = x¯, γˆ = γ, and θˆ =
θ. Therefore,
S(xˆ η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ),γ,θ) ≥ S(x¯ η,γ,θ), ∀η. (13)
Particularly, Eq. 13 holds for η = x∗∗ x¯ ∈ [0, 1]dim(xi)×n,
i.e.,
S(xˆ η∗(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ),γ,θ) ≥ S(x¯ x∗∗  x¯,γ,θ)
= S(x∗∗,γ,θ) = S∗∗. (14)
The left side of Eq. 14 is the ex-post social surplus achieved
by PVCG, while the right side is the maximum social surplus
across all possible x ≤ x¯, given (x¯,γ,θ). Hence, the right
side is also no less than the left side. Therefore, the left side
equals the right side.
Furthermore, given that incentive compatibility has been
proved in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, the following two
propositions provide sufficient and necessary conditions for
ex-post individual rationality and ex-post weak budget bal-
ancedness.
Proposition 3 (Condition for ex-post individual rationality).
PVCG is ex-post individual rational (IR) for all producers
i.f.f. the true capacity limits x¯, the true type parameters γ,θ,
and the adjustment payments h(·) satisfy
hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ) (15)
≥ −[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)], ∀i ∈ N.
Proof. According to truthfulness proved in Proposition 1
and Theorem 1, we use x¯,γ,θ to substitute xˆ, γˆ, θˆ in Eq.
6 and Eq. 7. Then, the ex-post utility of producer i becomes
ui(x¯,γ,θ) = pi(x¯,γ,θ)− c(x¯i  η∗i (x¯,γ,θ), γi) (16)
= S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ) + hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ).
Ex-post IR requires ui(x¯,γ,θ) ≥ 0,∀i, which is equivalent
to the inequality in Eq. 15.
Proposition 4 (Condition for ex-post weak budget balanced-
ness). PVCG is ex-post weakly budget balanced (WBB) on
the supply side i.f.f. the true capacity limits x¯, the true type
parameters γ,θ, and the adjustment payments h(·) satisfy
n−1∑
i=0
hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ) ≤ S∗(x¯,γ,θ)
−
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)]. (17)
Proof. According to truthfulness proved in Proposition 1
and Theorem 1, we use x¯,γ,θ to substitute xˆ, γˆ, θˆ in Eq.
6 and Eq. 7. Then, the ex-post total payment to all producers
is
n−1∑
i=0
pi(x¯,γ,θ) =
n−1∑
i=0
[τi(x¯,γ,θ) + hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)]
=
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)
+ c(x¯i  η∗i (x¯,γ,θ), γi) + hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)]. (18)
As explained before, Theorem 1 transforms the WBB
condition to
∑n−1
i=0 pi(x¯,γ,θ) ≤
∑n+m−1
j=n v(x¯ 
η∗(x¯,γ,θ), θj). This inequality, together with the defini-
tion S∗(x¯,γ,θ) =
∑n+m−1
j=n v(x¯  η∗(x¯,γ,θ), θj) −∑n−1
i=0 c(x¯i  η∗i (x¯,γ,θ), γi), transforms Eq. 18 to Eq.
17.
Then, we prove Eq. 8 is a sufficient and necessary confi-
tion for Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
Corollary 1. Under PVCG, a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for ex-post IR and ex-post WBB to coexist on the sup-
ply side is
LOSS = Loss1 + Loss2 = 0, (19)
where
Loss1 =
n−1∑
i=0
ReLu[−(S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ))
− hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)] and (20)
Loss2 = ReLu[
n−1∑
i=0
[(S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ))
+ hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)]− S∗(x¯,γ,θ)]. (21)
Proof. Loss1 ≥ 0, Loss2 ≥ 0,∀x¯,γ,θ. Loss1 = 0 i.f.f.
Eq. 15 holds; Loss2 = 0 i.f.f. Eq. 17 holds.
From Corollary 1, we know that if the adjustment pay-
ments h(x¯,γ,θ) are such chosen that Eq. 19 holds for true
capacity limits x¯ and true type parameters γ,θ, then PVCG
attains IR and WBB simultaneously. However, these true pa-
rameters are unknown to the coalition coordinator a priori,
we need to find the optimal adjustment payment function
h∗(·) such that for all possible x¯ and γ drawn from their
respective prior distributions, Eq. 19 holds. This is equiva-
lent to solve the functional equation in Eq. 8. When such a
functional solution exists, it minimizes the expected value of
LOSS = Loss1 + Loss2.
Corollary 2. The solution h∗(·) to Eq. 8, if existing, is also
a solution to the following minimization problem:
h∗(·) = argminh(·)E(x¯,γ,θ){LOSS}, (22)
where the expectation is over the prior distribution of
(x¯,γ,θ).
Proof. For the solution h∗(·) to Eq. 8,
LOSS ≡ 0, ∀(x,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x,γ,θ)). Therefore,
E(x¯,γ,θ){LOSS} = 0.
For all other function h(·), since LOSS ≥ 0, ∀(x¯,γ,θ),
we have E(x¯,γ,θ){LOSS} ≥ 0.
From Corollary 2, we can find the functional solution
h∗(·) to Eq. 8 by minimizing the expected LOSS. The re-
maining problem is to prove the existence of such a solution.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. The following inequality is a sufficient and nec-
essary condition for the existence of h∗(·) such that the
PVCG payments p(·) = τ (·) + h∗(·) satisfy WBB and IR
for all (x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)).
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗((min x¯i,x−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ)]
≤ S∗(x¯,γ,θ),∀(x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)), (23)
where min x¯i and max γi are the extreme values of x¯ and γ
on their support set supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)).
In order to prove Theorem 2, we introduce the following
lemma first.
Lemma 1. The maximum social surplus monotonically in-
creases with x¯i and monotonically decreases with γi for ev-
ery producer i.
Proof. Suppose x¯′ ≥ x¯; then, by definition,
S∗(x¯′,γ,θ) ≥ S(x¯′η,γ,θ), ∀η ∈ [0, 1]dim(xi)×n. (24)
Particularly, Eq. 13 holds for η = η∗(x¯,η,θ)  x¯  x¯′ ∈
[0, 1]dim(xi)×n, i.e.,
S∗(x¯′,γ,θ) ≥ S(x¯′  η∗(x¯,γ,θ) x¯ x¯′,γ,θ)
= S∗(x¯,γ,θ). (25)
Therefore, S∗(x¯,γ,θ) increases with x¯i.
That S∗(x¯,γ,θ) decreases with γi is due to the envelope
theorem, which results in
∂S∗
∂γi
|η=η∗ = ∂S
∂γi
|η=η∗ = − ∂ci
∂γi
|η=η∗ ≤ 0. (26)
Now we can prove Theorem 2 as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove sufficiency first.
If Eq. 23 holds, we aim to prove
hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ) ≡ −[S∗((min x¯i, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ)−
S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)], i = 0, . . . , n − 1 satisfy Eq. 15 and 17
for all (x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)).
In this case, all (x¯,γ,θ) satisfy Eq. 15 because of the
monotonic property proved in Lemma 1, i.e.,
S∗((min x¯i, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ)
≤ S∗(x¯,γ,θ), ∀x¯,γ,θ ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)). (27)
Meanwhile, Eq. 17 becomes
n−1∑
i=0
{−[S∗((min x¯i, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ)
− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)]} ≤ S∗(x¯,γ,θ)
−
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)], (28)
which can be deduced from Eq. 23.
To prove necessity, we set x¯ = (min x¯i, x¯−i) and γ =
(max γi,γ−i) in Eq. 15 and get a necessary condition:
hi(x¯−i,γ−i,θ) ≥ −[S∗((min x¯i, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ)
− S∗−i(x¯−i,γ−i,θ)],∀x¯,γ,θ ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)).
(29)
Eq. 29, together with Eq. 17, results in Eq. 23.
There are some useful corollaries of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. The functional solution h∗(·) to Eq. 8 exists if
the prior estimation on (x¯,γ is accurate enough.
Proof. When the the prior estimation on (x¯,γ) is accu-
rate enough, x¯i approaches to min x¯i and γi approaches to
max γi); hence, the left side of Eq. 23 approaches 0, while
the right side approaches a positive number.
Corollary 4. If the individual valuation function is super
additive and with decreasing cross marginal returns, there
exists at least one solution h∗(·) to Eq. 8 such that dominant
incentive compatibility, ex-post allocative efficiency, ex-post
individual rationality, and ex-post weak budget balanced-
ness are simultaneously attained on the supply side.
Proof. According to Lemma 1,
S∗((min x¯i, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ) (30)
≥ S∗((0, x¯−i), (max γi,γ−i),θ) = S∗((0, x¯−i),γ,θ).
Hence, a sufficient condition for Eq. 23 to hold in this case
is
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗((0, x¯−i),γ,θ)]
≤ S∗(x¯,γ,θ), ∀x¯,γ,θ ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)). (31)
For arbitrary (x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)), suppose
η∗ maximizes S(x¯  η,γ,θ). The corresponding optimal
social surplus are denoted by S∗(x¯,γ,θ), i.e.,
S∗(x¯,γ,θ) = S(x¯ η∗,γ,θ)
=
n+m−1∑
j=n
v(x¯ η∗, θj)−
n−1∑
i=0
c(x¯i  η∗i , γi). (32)
We use η∗i and η
∗
−i to denote the components of η
∗.
According to the definition of S∗((0, x¯−i),γ,θ) , we
know
S∗((0, x¯−i),γ,θ) ≥ S((0, x¯−i) η,γ,θ), ∀η, (33)
which is particularly true for η = η∗
According to Assumption 4 and 2,
v(x¯ η∗, θj)− v((0, x¯−i) η∗, θj)
=v((x¯i  η∗i , x¯−i  η∗−i), θj)− v((0, x¯−i  η∗−i), θj)
≤v((x¯i  η∗i ,0, . . . ,0), θj)− v((0,0, . . . ,0), θj)
=v(x¯i  η∗i , θj), ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M. (34)
Then, we can derive
S∗(x¯,γ,θ) = S(x¯ η∗,γ,θ)
=
n+m−1∑
j=n
v(x¯ η∗, θj)−
n−1∑
i=0
c(x¯i  η∗i , γi)
≥
n+m−1∑
j=n
n−1∑
i=0
v(x¯i  η∗i , θj)−
n−1∑
i=0
c(x¯i  η∗i , γi)
≥
n−1∑
i=0
{
n+m−1∑
j=n
[v(x¯ η∗, θj)− v((0, x¯−i) η∗, θj)]
− c(x¯i  η∗i , γi)}
=
n−1∑
i=0
[
n+m−1∑
j=n
v(x¯ η∗, θj)−
n−1∑
k=0
c(x¯k  η∗k, γk)]
−
n−1∑
i=0
[
n+m−1∑
j=n
v((0, x¯−i) η∗, θj)
− c(0 η∗i , γi)−
n−1∑
k=0,6=i
c(x¯k  η∗k, γk)]
=
n−1∑
i=0
[S(x¯ η∗,γ,θ)− S((0, x¯−i) η∗,γ,θ)]
≥
n−1∑
i=0
[S∗(x¯,γ,θ)− S∗((0, x¯−i),γ,θ)], (35)
where the first ineqaulity is due to super additivity, the sec-
ond inequality is a result from Eq. 34, and the third in-
equality is from Eq. 32 and 33. Eq. 35 is true for arbitrary
(x¯,γ,θ) ∈ supp(Prior(x¯,γ,θ)), so we get Eq. 31, which is
a sufficient condition for the existence of h∗(·) as a solution
to 8.
Figure 1: The structure of the composite neural network of
PVCG
Lastly, it is worth pointing out even for those cases where
there is no solution to Eq. 8 (i.e., Assuption 3-5 do not hold),
an optimal h∗ can still be found by minimizing the expected
LOSS in Eq. 22. Such an optimal h∗ guarantees the ex-
pected deviation from the IR and WBB constraints are min-
imized.
Learning the Optimal Adjustment Payments
Corollary 2 informs us that we can learn the optimal ad-
justment payments h∗(·) by minimizing the expected LOSS
in Eq. 22. Also, we know neural networks can approximate
arbitrary continuous functions to arbitrary precisions (Fu-
nahashi 1989). Therefore, we construct n neural networks
NEThi , i ∈ N to approximate hi(·), i ∈ N . Output nodes of
these n networks, denoted by NEThi .o, i ∈ N , are combined
into a single composite neural network in Figure 1 with the
following loss function:
LOSS =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
{
n−1∑
i=0
ReLu[−(S∗t − S∗t−i)− NEThi .o]
+ ReLu[
n−1∑
i=0
([(S∗t − S∗t−i) + NEThi .o]− S∗t)], (36)
where each sample (x¯t,γt,θt) is drawn from their prior dis-
tribution Prior(x¯,γ,θ) and T is the sample size. For the
tth sample, τ t = τ (x¯t,γt,θt), S∗t = S∗(x¯t,γt,θt), and
S∗t−i = S
∗(x¯t−i,γ
t
−i,θ
t
−i). Since we only need synthetic
data to train this network, we can generate as many data as
needed. As a result, LOSS can be minimized to its theoreti-
cal minimum almost perfectly in experiments.
To illustrate the effectiveness of this neural network
method and to show the correctness of Corollary 4, we
learned the adjustment payments for a hypothetical scenario.
We set the individual valuation functions and individual cost
functions as follows:
v(x) = θi
√√√√n(n−1∑
k=0
xk) and ci(xi, γi) = γixi, i ∈ N. (37)
Note that the individual valuation function in Eq. 37 is
a special case of that in Eq. 3, where z(xi) is set to be
Figure 2: Training loss v.s. iterations (left) and PVCG pay-
ment v.s. reported capacity limit & reported cost type (right)
z(xi) =
√
xi. We report the experiment results for n =
10,m = 2, Prior(x¯i) = Uniform[0, 5], i ∈ N , Prior(γi) =
Uniform[0, 1], i ∈ N , and Prior(θj) = [0, 1], j ∈M . We let
NEThi , i ∈ N each have three 10-dimensional hidden layers.
The loss curve is shown in the left figure of Fig. 2. The
training loss fast converges to 0 after 40 iterations, as ex-
pected. After we obtain the trained networks [NEThi ], i ∈ N ,
we can use trained networks to calculate PVCG payments
p(xˆ, γˆ, θˆ) for any reported (xˆ, γˆ, θˆ). For illustration, we
draw p0, the payment to participant 0, with respect to xˆ0 and
γˆ0 in the right figure in Fig. 2, fixing parameters of other
participants at xˆi ≡ 2.5, γˆi ≡ 0.5, i ∈ N, 6= 0, θˆj ≡ 0.5, j ∈
M .
We can see that p0 increases with x¯0. This aligns well with
our expectation that the higher the capacity limit a producer
reports, the more input resources are contributed by this pro-
ducer; hence, it receives higher payments. Also, p0 remains
constant with γ0 when γ0 is below a threshold and sharply
drops to around 0 when γ0 passes the threshold. This implies
that the payment to a producer should only be affected by
its contribution to the cooperative production process rather
than its cost, but if a producer’s cost is too high, the optimal
social choice is to exclude this producer from the production
coalition and thus pay it nothing.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented the Procurement-VCG (PVCG)
mechanism for incentivizing producers to collaboratively
produce some valuable virtual products. PVCG incentivizes
capacitated producers to truthfully report their capacity lim-
its and their cost types, based on which we optimize for
social surplus and guarantee ex-post allocative efficiency.
With some reasonable assumptions, we prove that PVCG
is ex-post individually rational and ex-post weakly budget
balanced. To our knowledge, PVCG is among the very few
mechanisms in the mechanism design literature that attain
these four objectives simultaneously.
Since this paper focuses on theoretical analyses, we re-
ported limited experimental results. When the number of
producers increase, we require more advanced algorithms
to learn the PVCG payments efficiently. Besides, for non-
analytic individual valuation functions and individual cost
functions, calculating the optimal social surplus is compu-
tationally expensive as well. These computational issues are
beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
Also, in order to apply PVCG to scenarios such as fed-
erated learning, some special-purpose engineering designs
(e.g., a sandbox) are required to measure the required pa-
rameters in our model, e.g., the input datasets and the out-
put model. These implementation details will be discussed in
our subsequent research. Moreover, in our following work,
we will report simulation results that compare PVCG with
other sharing rules for cooperative games, e.g., Shapley (Jia
et al. 2019), Labour Union (Gollapudi et al. 2017), etc.
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